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TRADE REGULATION'
THE UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1.
The increasing complexity of modern merchandising has rendered much
of the existing law of trade decelition inadequate. COmmOn 'law torts such as
misrepresentation, disparagement, and false advertising have not developed
in sufficient measure to cope with business injuries resulting from deceptive
trade practices, with the result that parties affected'by deceptive traderepre-
sentations are often unprotected. In 1964, the National Conference, of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform. Deceptive Trade
Practices Act' in an effort to overcome this underdeveloped, section of the law.
I. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES UNDER THE Aci.
Section 2 of the act sets out those trade practices which are deceptive under
the act. "Passing off"2
 and "confusion as to source,"3 traditionally : tortious
conduct, are•included. 4 Each of these terms is part of the more general,tort
known as misrepresentation. The act substantially alters the common law tort
of misrepresentation by eliminating any requirement of actual confusion and
competition; which is .prerequisite in some states,° and substituting instead
mere likelihood of confusion.° Furthermore,. subsections 2(a)(2) and (3)
have broadened the traditionally narrow concept of "confusion as: to source"
to include confusion as to sponsorship, approval, certification,, affiliation, con-
nection, and association as well. In addition, in order to create a basis from
which a court could establish a new kind of misrepresentation not specifically
set out in the act, subsection 2(a) (12) designates as a deceptive trade prac-
tice any other conduct similarly creating a likelihood of confusion or of mis-
understanding.
Unfortunately, the Uniform Act does not set forth any guidelines for
•	 ,.	 •
1 9 U.L.A. 183 (Supp. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Act]. To date five states
have adopted the act. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-115(c)-(g) (Supp. 1965); 6 Del. Code
§§ 1401-07, as noted in 9 U.LA. 183 (Supp. 1965); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 48-601 to -606
(Supp. 1965); 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 121%, §§ 311-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 78, §§ .51-55 (Supp. 1965).
2 "Passing off" characterizes the practice whereby a businesiman diverts ,customer
patronage from a competitor by copying the competitor's productand marketing it as his
own. In such a situation, the customer, 'a third party, is deceived not as to the source of
the product, but as to the product itself. • •
3 "Confusion as to source" refers to the same kind of copying present in a "passing
off" situation, but results in deceiving the customer as to the source of the product-This
result occurs when a product has acquired a "secondary meaning"—that is, when the
consumer has identified a certain product with a certain, manufacturer. In these circum-
stances, the customer chooses to purchase product "A" on the basis: of its source of
manufacture, but is deceived into buying the competitor's product because of its identical
design•or name.. •
4 Uniform Act §§ 2(a)(1), (2).
5 Some states require actual competition in business. between two ,products.or with
respect to a rival territory, e.g., Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,:Michigan,, Minnesota,
Missouri and New Jersey. Others do not make the existence of actual competition a
prerequisite, but consider its absence an important negative factor, e.g„, South Carolina.
0 Uniform Act §§ 2(a) (2), (3).
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determining when likelihood of confusion has occurred. Some insight as to
the meaning of "likelihood of confusion," however, may be gained by examina-
tion of the second tentative draft:
[L]ikelihood of confusion or deception is determined by considering
the general impression created by a method, act, or practice upon
an ordinary purchaser buying under normally prevalent conditions in
the trade and giving the attention that a purchaser usually gives in
buying that class of goods or services.'
Essentially, the test reduces itself to little more than whether a reasonable
purchaser is likely to be confused or deceived by a trade practice. Suppose
an article such as a Bavarian-style beer mug has become associated in the
eyes of the public with a certain manufacturer "A" (secondary meaning);
if another beer mug of identical design, with an identifying label deep inside
its well, is marketed by manufacturer "B," it is doubtful that a reasonably
prudent purchaser would examine the inside of the copied mug which he
believed to originate from "A!' Under the "likelihood of confusion" test set
out in the second tentative draft, the deceived customer could maintain a
misrepresentation action, since the apparently identical design and inconspicu-
ous labeling would result in confusion to a reasonable consumer. However, if
the article on sale was a console stereo set, with an identifying label on the
inside cover, the result might be different. In this instance, reasonably prudent
consumer conduct should include an examination sufficient to discover the
manufacturer's label under the cover and near the controls.°
The omission from the act of a definition of "likelihood of confusion" is
significant, for if the act is to be uniform in its effect, then a definite standard
should be set out in the text for the benefit of the courts. The Commissioners'
comment to the official edition, stating that the standard is to be found in the
Restatement of Torts,° has proven inadequate, since only Illinois has printed
the comments of the Commissioners, and no adopting state has incorporated
the definition in tato.
Subsections 2 (a) (5) through (11) relate to deceptive advertising prac-
tices and are divided into three main areas. The first encompasses false repre-
sentations as to sponsorship, approval, affiliation, characteristics, ingredients,
uses, benefits, quantities, and status;'° as to condition or age of goods;"
as to the standards, quality, grade, style, or model of goods or services;' 2
and as to reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions. 13 The
second part proscribes the disparagement of goods, services, or business of
another." The third makes actionable the advertisement of goods or services
Uniform Act § 1(b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1963).
8
 Estate Stove Co. v. Gray & Dudley Co., 41 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1930), vacated on
other grounds, 50 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1931).
9
 Uniform Act 1(a) (2), Comment; Restatement (Second), Torts § 729, comment
a (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
to Uniform Act § 2(a)(5).
11 Uniform Act § 2(a) (6).
12 Uniform Act 2(a)(7).
13 Uniform Act § 2(a)(11).
14 Uniform Act § 2(a)(8).
124
CURRENT LEGISLATION
with intent neither to supply reasonably expected public demand, nor to sell
them as advertised.' 5
With respect to the false representations of the first division, the act
provides that a party, upon showing likelihood of injury, may enjoin another
from falsely advertising goods or services.'° Thus the injured party is entitled
to injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of actual damage and actual
competition with the injuring party.
This approach constitutes a significant advance from existing common
and statutory law. At common law false and misleading advertising has been
recognized as a tort, but one for which only the deceived customer has had an
adequate remedy." The competitor is precluded from maintaining an action
unless he can prove special damages—that his product would have been
purchased by the customer but for the deceptive advertising. 18 Since the likeli-
hood of such proof is remote, the competitor, for all practical purposes, has
not been protected from deceptive advertising practices. Furthermore, by
definition, the non-competitor has been totally unprotected. Statutory law,
although more encompassing in its range of parties, nevertheless remains
incomplete and inadequate by virtue of its application to a narrow range
of products.'°
In the second main area of protection from deceptive advertising, the
Uniform Act provides a cause of action to a party whose goods, services,
or business are disparaged. 2" "Trade disparagement" refers to the situation
where a customer is diverted from purchasing a certain product because of
the derogatory representations made by another. It should be noted that
the moving party does not carry a but for burden, but, as in the case of false
and misleading advertising, need merely show a likelihood of confusion. 2 '
Furthermore, actual competition between the parties is not required. 22 The
act substantially augments the common law tort of disparagement by a more
comprehensive inclusion of deceptive trade practices and by elimination of
the allegation and proof of pecuniary damages. 23
In jurisdictions where the common law tort of disparagement is recog-
nized, certain representations have been held privileged and, hence, non-
actionable. 24 The Uniform Act makes no such explicit allowances, and thus
raises the question of whether this common law privilege exists under the
act. Here it is important to note that the privilege has been extended only
in Uniform Act §§ 2(a) (9), (10).
16 Uniform Act § 3(a).
17 Cal!man, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 876 (1948).
18 Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosier Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on
other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
19
 E.g., North Carolina restricts its statute to diamonds. N.C. Gen. Stat. H 66-74
(1965). Only six states have comprehensive deceptive advertising legislation. Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann, § 44-1481 (1965); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 42-115(a) (Supp. 1965); La. Rev.
Stat. § 51:411 (Supp. 1962); N.D. Cent. Code H 51-12-01 to -14 (Supp. 1965); Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 646.810 (1966); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 100.18 (1957).
20
 Uniform Act § 2(a) (8)-
21 Uniform Act § 2(a)(12).
22
 Uniform Act § 2(b).
23 Uniform Act 3(a).
24
 Prosser, Torts § 122 (3d ed. 1964).
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to situations where a defendant is seeking to protect an existing property
interest.25
 This is to be distinguished from the situation where one makes
disparaging remarks, however well-intentioned, about the quality of another's
goods or the conduct of his business. By these representations, defendant
is seeking to attract business, rather than to protect an existing property inter-
est, and such conduct is never privileged 2 2
 The Uniform Act provides that
false or misleading representations which disparage the goods, services, or
business of another are actionable.27
 Its concern, then, goes only to the pro-
tection of competition for future business and not to the protection of existing
property interests. Consequently, it is submitted that common law privileged
disparagement has no place in the Uniform Act.
The third main area of deceptive advertising is covered by subsections
2 (a) (9) and (10), which prohibit the advertising of goods and services where
the advertiser has the intent neither to sell them as advertised, nor to satisfy
reasonably expected public demand. 22
 It is important to note that these sub-
sections explicitly require an intent to deceive, notwithstanding the fact that
section 3 of the act generally dispenses with intent as a prerequisite to an
action 29
 The burden on the plaintiff of proving intent may present a serious
roadblock to the exercise of these sections. The use of inferences to establish
a prima facie case of intent, however, could substantially lessen this burden.
For example, several state statutes prohibit the sale of goods below cost if
the seller intends to minimize competition or destroy a competitor, and in
many instances these statutes provide that advertising, offering to sell, or
selling such goods below cost is prima facie evidence of intent." This approach
could effectively be applied to subsections 2(a) (9) and (10) of the act.
Accordingly, an offer to sell sofa-beds at an attractive price would constitute
a prima fade case of intent not to satisfy reasonably expected public demand
if the seller has in fact only two sofa-beds available for sale and does business
in a large city where customer demand is high. Once the plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie case, he is entitled to get to the jury. The defendant
in most situations will come forth with some contrary evidence at this point.
This is not an inequitable burden, since he is the party best informed as to
the circumstances surrounding the advertisement, reasonable public demand,
and the available quantity of stock.
Subsection 2 (c) provides that any unfair practice otherwise actionable
25
 Thus, one is privileged to assert in good faith that another has infringed his
patent or trademark by the sale of goods. Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Lab.,
Inc., 269 Fid 375 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 893 (1959).
22 National Ref. Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763, 770-71 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 275 U.S. 570 (1927); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 24, § 122.
27 Uniform Act I 2(a) (8).
22 It should be noted that Connecticut has deleted these subsections from the Uniform
Act. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. * 42-115(d) (Supp. 1965). However, under Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. I 42-115(a) (Supp. 1965), the whole area of deceptive advertising practices is
treated in depth. The substance of the provisions omitted from the Uniform Act are
contained therein.
29
 The Uniform Act 2(a) (10) allows the advertiser to protect himself from liability
for this kind of false advertising by disclosing a quantity limitation in his advertisement.
30 E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. * 44-1466 (1956); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4678(8m)
(1961).
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under common or statutory law remains unaffected by the act. At first glance
this provision may appear to diminish uniformity, but it should be noted that
the law of unfair competition includes many areas in which state interest may
vary." The enumeration of additional deceptive practices in an attempt to
broaden the scope of the act would have rendered it a clumsy document and
lessened its chance of adoption by the states. Prudently, the act covers those
deceptive trade practices which affect all jurisdictions, leaving the regulation
of regional trade practices to the individual states. This allows for the unin-
hibited development of the local law of trade deception and unfair competi-
tion.
Section 3 of the act sets out the injunctive relief available upon a showing
of any of the practices outlined in section 2. Potential injury resulting from
deceptive conduct is sufficient to warrant equitable relief, and the act ex-
plicitly eliminates the common law proof requirements of monetary damages,
loss of profits, or intent to deceive. 82 This liberal approach reflects the
draftsmen's awareness that damage, once done, may be irreparable. Accord-
ingly, the act has taken on a preventative, as well as remedial aspect, by
providing for the injunction of deceptive trade practices before any damage
occurs.
The last sentence of subsection 3(a) limits the scope of relief available
with respect to "articles" to the prevention of confusion or misunderstanding
as to source. Since this limitation applies only to articles, it would appear
that the copying of non-articles, such as packaging, common Iaw copyrights,
and trade secrets, falls within the broader provisions of the first part of
section 3(a). This reference to "articles" results from the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co3 3 and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting Co. 84 Both cases involved actions for infringement of
design patents and for unfair competition. In Sears, the plaintiff designed
a pole lamp which was obviously copied by the defendant. In Compco, the
defendant copied the plaintiff's design of a fluorescent lighting fixture with a
cross-ribbed reflector. The lower courts in each instance held the design
patent invalid, but allowed an injunction against copying on the basis of
unfair competition resulting from source confusion," In reversing both cases,
the Supreme Court held the unpatented articles to be in the public domain
and refused to grant an absolute injunction." It stated that the courts may
do no more than require the manufacturer of the copy to label his article
in such a way as to eliminate confusion as to source." Accordingly, the
37 E.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17532 provides that the knowing advertisement of
coal by other than its true name or description constitutes an act of unfair competition.
a2 Uniform Act § 3(a).
33 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
34 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
35 Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963); Day-Brite
Lighting Co. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
36 Sears, Roebuck Sr Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra note 33; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting Co., supra note 34.
37 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra note 33, at 232; Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting Co., supra note 34, at 2313.
127
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
limitation in the act is an attempt to accommodate these recent Supreme Court
decisions.
Section 3 of the act also provides for the awarding of attorneys' fees and
costs. As originally adopted, the first sentence of subsection 3 (b) was optional
and allowed the courts, in exceptional cases, to award reasonable attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party.38 The second sentence of the subsection pro-
vided that costs, and, optionally, attorneys' fees might be assessed only if
the court finds that the defendant had willfully engaged in a deceptive trade
practice." At their conference in 1966, however, the Commissioners amended
section 3 to provide for the awarding of costs to the prevailing party unless
the court directs otherwise.4° The amendment further provides for the award
of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if (1) the complaining party has
brought an action known to be groundless, or (2) the party charged with a
deceptive trade practice has willfully engaged in the practice knowing it to
be deceptive. Thus, the Commissioners have eliminated the "exceptional
cases" qualification from the award of attorneys' fees. The amended provi-
sion adds certainty to what was no more than a general scheme capable of
varied interpretation. Consequently, a party is now in a better position to
estimate the cost of litigation and thereby more effectively weigh the merits
of initiating a legal contest.
Section 4 exempts from provisions of the act "publishers, broadcasters,
printers, or other persons engaged in the dissemination of information or
reproduction of printed or pictorial matter," so long as they are without
knowledge of the deceptive character of the contents of the materials they
disseminate. It remains unclear, however, whether actual knowledge, or merely
constructive notice will suffice as the effective test of liability. This condi-
tional exemption recognizes the impossible burden of checking the substantive
accuracy of all trade representations, and acknowledges the fact that it is the
businessman, and not the printer, who reaps the profits from the deceptive
advertising practices. But should a disseminator, for one reason or another,
be put on guard, he ought to come under an affirmative duty to investigate
further. At that point, the commitment of his time and resources is not intoler-
able when balanced against the public interest in truthful advertising.
II. WEAKNESSES OF THE ACT
The act contains four major shortcomings. First, the important area of
dilution has been neglected altogether. "Dilution" is the use of another's name
or mark in such a way as to reduce its distinctiveness." Usually, dilution is
involved in situations in which there will be no likelihood of confusion, since
the diluting product will typically be dissimilar to the one diluted. For example,
33 Uniform Act § 3(b) (1964).
39 Ibid.
49 Unifortn Act § 3(b).
41
 See generally Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution
Statutes, 44 Calif, L. Rev. 439, 463-76 (1956). Substantial injury may also result from
the widespread use of a name or mark in a non-commercial manner, with the result that
it acquires a generic interpretation. Such injury is uncompensable. See Bayer Co. v.
United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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it is reasonable to assume that there would not be source confusion between
"Polaroid" and "Polaraid," since the former manufactures photographic
equipment, and the latter installs refrigeration and heating systems; yet the
use of the name "Polaraid" was enjoined as diluting the name "Polaroid."'"
There are several possible reasons why dilution protection has been
omitted from the Uniform Act. First, the Commissioners may have felt that
the Lanham Act" had preempted the states in this area," even though that
act has no anti-dilution clause of its own. Second, judicial interpretation of
dilution statutes has been restrictive in all of the five adopting states" except
Illinois." Third, the draftsmen may have been of the view that the possible
injury is insufficient to warrant dilution legislation." Finally, it may have been
feared that the liberal tenor of dilution protection would hinder broad accep-
tance of the Uniform Act, especially in conservative states.
For whatever reason dilution protection was omitted from the act, the
fact remains that the distinctiveness of a trade name or trademark is deserving
of protection." A party should not be permitted to realize financial gain by
appropriating the name or mark of another while at the same time dimming its
distinctiveness. The concept of free competition is not compromised by putting
the offender to the test of creating his own "good will." The Uniform Act
should incorporate a dilution section if it is to constitute a comprehensive law of
deceptive trade practices.
The second criticism of the Uniform Act results from the draftsmen's
effort in subsection 3 (a) to tailor relief in copying cases so as to come within
the Sears and Compco doctrine. As noted earlier, the Court held in both cases
that a party may not enjoin the exact copying of his unpatented article, but
could merely obtain an order requiring the other party to identify the copy as
his own. This, the Court suggested, might be done through proper labeling or
by the use of other precautionary devices."
With these holdings specifically in mind, the Commissioners attempted to
limit the relief available in situations involving article copying. Therefore, in
the last sentence of subsection 3 (a), they provided that relief granted with
respect to articles shall be limited to the prevention of confusion or misunder-
standing as to source. The draftsmen probably intended such relief to be
effected by an order requiring that the copy be sufficiently labeled. It should
42
 Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.26 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
43
 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1964).
49 See, e.g., Sargent & Co. v. Welco Feed Mfg. Co., 195 F.2d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1952) ;
'Dine, Inc. v.	 Inc., 123 F. Supp. 446, 451 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
45 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 35-111(c) (1963); Ga. Code Ann. § 106-15 (1956) ; 111.
Ann. Stat. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110 § 7A
(1958) ; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368D.
40
 E.g., compare Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 177 F.2d 177 (1st Cir.
1949), and Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Libby, 103 F. Supp. 968 (D. Mass. 1952), with
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., supra note 42.
47
 See Comment, Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-O'-The-Wisp? 77
Ham L. Rev. 520, 528 (1964).
48
 National City Bank v. National City Window Cleaning Co., 180 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1962), remanded on other grounds, 174 Ohio St. 510, 190 N.E.2d 437 (1963).
99 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra note 33, at 232; Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting Co., supra note 34, at 238.
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be noted, however, that instances have occurred, 5° and will again occur, where
labeling alone will not obviate source confusion. In these instances, the only
way to prevent source confusion may be to enjoin the exact duplication of
the article itself. It is arguable that section 3(a) does not foreclose such an
absolute injunction: the language specifically calls for the prevention of
source confusion, but it does not proscribe enjoining of the copying of an
unpatented article. It is submitted, however, that such a prohibitory order
would be contra to the Sears and Canipco doctrines, for in Sears it was stated
that "because of the federal patent laws a State may not, when the article is
unpatented , prohibit the copying of the article itself... . "51
 The Commis-
sioners would have more effectively complied with Sears and Compco had they
incorporated this statement into the text of the Uniform Act.
A third flaw in the Uniform Act is that while offering remedial relief for
both the businessman and the consumer, it fails to take notice of the practi-
calities of consumer injury. The consumer who is duped by a deceptive trade
practice will usually not undertake the burden of initiating a law suit, since
the extent of his damage seldom overrides the expense of litigation. In this
situation, the deceptive conduct will often continue without restraint until a
competitor of the deceiving party becomes aware of its damaging effect upon
his own interests. It would seem, therefore, that if the consumer class is to be
adequately protected, the procedure for invoking statutory remedies must
be made easier for the purchaser
Connecticut has undertaken to reduce the practical barrier that separates
the consumer from his statutory rights. 62
 That state provides for a Commis-
sioner of Consumer Protection and allows him to proceed against any person
he reasonably believes to have violated the law of unfair sales practices.
Furthermore, any person may present evidence of such violations to the
Commissioner. Thus, the activity of a single customer in bringing his com-
plaint to the Commissioner, and the subsequent action by the Commissioner,
serves to increase the protection afforded the consumer public.
Undoubtedly some jurisdictions would be reluctant to establish another
state office necessarily requiring staff and funds with which to operate. Yet, the
additional expense to the state is of small consequence when one balances it
with the public interest against deceptive trade practices. The Uniform Act
would more effectively meet its responsibility to the consumer if it, too, made
allowance for this kind of assistance.
A fourth difficulty with the act results from the fact that state variations
such as the Oklahoma modification concerning confusion, 53
 threaten to impose
upon its uniformity. Although the problem of uniformity and state variations
is one common to all efforts at uniform state legislation, it is submitted that
5° E.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 424 (1916).
51
 Sears, Roebuck it Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra note 33, at 232.
52 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 42-112 (Supp. 1965).
68 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 78, §§ 53(a) (2), (3) (Stipp. 1965). The Oklahoma modification
eliminates any clause involving likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding, and uses
instead knowledge of confusion or misrepresentation. As a result, the moving party must
establish that the defendant knowingly made false representations. This amendment
severely restricts the scope of the Uniform Act, which requires that instances of confusion
and misunderstanding be clarified without regard to the motives behind their origin.
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with respect to uniform deceptive trade practices this problem need not
necessarily arise, since unlike some other areas of the law, unfair competition
involves substantial interstate activity and thus falls within the regulatory
power of the federal government. Thus, enactment of a federal law of unfair
competition would obviate most of the problems caused by state variations.
LEGISLATIVE OUTLOOK
A comprehensive federal law of unfair competition may already exist in
the form of the Federal Trade Commission Act" and the Lanham Act." These
acts allow for the application of federal Iaw by federal courts in private unfair
competition cases without the requirement of monetary injury." Judicial
interpretation of these statutes, however, has run contrary to the thesis, and
the courts have restricted the scope of the Lanham and Federal Trade Com-
mission Acts in many instances by confining their injunctive remedies to situa-
tions involving a public interest." As a result, private relief is not compre-
hensively provided for by existing federal legislation.
In response to the decisional evidence that no existing federal unfair com-
petition law presently exists, legislation constituting such a law has been sub-
mitted to Congress on many occasions. 58 The Lindsay Bill, presently before
the House," parallels the Uniform Act. It includes within its scope confusion,
false or misleading advertising, and a general prohibition against any act
likely to deceive." Competition between the parties is not required, nor is the
absence of actual damages to the public interest a valid defense." Broad-
casters and publishers are exempt providing they have no knowledge of
deceptive conduct." An important difference between the Lindsay Bill and
the Uniform Act, however, is that the proposed bill covers the area of dilution
protection." Since the enactment of the Lindsay Bill would result in a compre-
hensive and uniform law of deceptive trade practices, it deserves more careful
consideration by Congress.
There are, however, deceptive trade practices which cannot by any
standard be said to involve interstate commerce. Accordingly, application of
state law cannot be absolutely foreclosed even by sweeping federal legislation.
For this reason the Uniform Act has a definite contribution to make. Although
it is thorough in those areas of the law traditionally recognized by the more
liberal jurisdictions as constituting deceptive trade practices, it could be
54 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1964).
55 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1964).
56 See Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 987 (1949) ;
Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 19 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 87 (1964).
57 See FTC v. Klessner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929) ; National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Dinwell-
Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 504 (D. Mass. 1942).
58 H.R. 7833, 86th Cong,, 1st Sess., 105 Cong. Rec. 11337 (1959) ; S. 1036, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., 107 Cong. Rec. 2516 (1961) ; H.R. 10038, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 Cong. Rec.
9601 (1962) ; H.R. 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 Cong. Rec. 3774 (1963).
59 Ibid.
64/ H.R. 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 3(b) (1963).
81 H.R. 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1963).
52 H.R. 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1963).
433 H.R. 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (3) (1963).
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expanded to include dilution, and modified in certain of its other provisions.
The exemption granted information disseminators, for example, should be
withdrawn upon the showing of constructive knowledge of deceptive advertise-
ments. The act also should incorporate a prima fade intent theory in those
deceptive advertising sections requiring intent. Privileged disparagement ought
to be clearly written out of the law. A definition or standard of "likelihood of
confusion" should be stated in the text of the act itself. Lastly, provision
should be made for a more realistic procedure which allows the consumer
himself to move against deceptive trade conduct without undertaking the costs
of litigation.
The Uniform Act continues to merit enactment by the individual states.
Together, the Lindsay Bill, applied in interstate commerce, and the Uniform
Act, applied on the local level, would mark significant progress in an important
area of the law.
DAVID M. COHEN
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